

Message Text

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ORIGIN EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 FEA-01 PM-05 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-10
NEA-10 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00
EB-08 NRC-05 OES-07 DODE-00 ERDA-05 SS-15 SP-02
SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 ERDE-00 /136 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/RPE: W R SALISBURY: FF
APPROVED BY EUR: R D VINE
OES/NET: J BORIGHT
ACDA: F HOUCK
PM: R JONES (INFO)
DOE: MR. BENGLES DORF (INFO)
-----104249 221706Z /45

O R 221633Z OCT 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 254512

VIENNA FOR USIAEA, BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEEC

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: EEC, TECH, IAEA, MNUC

SUBJECT: US-EURATOM DISCUSSION OF SAFEGUARDS -- INFORMAL
CONVERSATION WITH FRG REPS
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REF: BRUSSELS 14323 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVES OF OES, ACDA, DOE AND EUR MET
INFORMALLY OCTOBER 20 WITH MEMBERS OF FRG INFCE DELEGATION
(LED BY LOOSCH) TO INFORM GERMANS ABOUT PROSPECTIVE DIS-
CUSSIONS WITH EC COMMISSION OFFICIALS ON US VIEWS REGARDING

IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IN ADDITION, AMBASSADOR GERARD SMITH MET WITH AMBASSADOR DITTMAN, HEAD OF FRG DELEGATION, ON SAME SUBJECT OCTOBER 21. GERMANS INDICATED CONCERN ABOUT EFFECT US VIEWS COULD HAVE ON THE COMPROMISE REACHED BY THE TWO PARTIES ON THE EURATOM-IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, BUT THOUGHT THAT NEXT WEEK'S MEETINGS COULD BE USEFUL IN BEGINNING MORE FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND EURATOM. US ITERATED OUR BASIC INTEREST IN WORKING TOWARD WORLDWIDE APPLICATION OF EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS, AND CONCERN OVER PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT OF EURATOM/IAEA ARRANGEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. BORIGHT (OES) OUTLINED OUR EFFORTS TO FOLLOW COURSE OF EURATOM-IAEA TALKS IN THE PAST, NOTED US/EURATOM DISCUSSION WAS OVERDUE AND EXPLAINED US INTEREST IN MAINTAINING BASIC

IAEA RIGHT TO APPLY INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION. LOOSCH INDICATED "SURPRISE" THAT WE HAD NOT CONSULTED MORE FREQUENTLY WITH EURATOM OFFICIALS AS CALLED FOR BY THE US-EURATOM COOPERATION AGREEMENT, AND HOPED THAT MEETINGS NEXT WEEK WOULD MARK BEGINNING OF MORE REGULAR CONSULTATION.

3. WHILE APPRECIATING OUR POINT THAT US SAFEGUARDS CONCERNS WERE DIRECTED TOWARD ALL IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND NOT JUST THOSE IN EURATOM, AND THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER WE HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN EURATOM SYSTEM, LOOSCH EXPRESSED CONFIDENTIAL

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CONCERN THAT "BY PINNING YOUR GENERAL SAFEGUARDS ARGUMENTS" TO THE EURATOM-IAEA IMPLEMENTATION COMPROMISE, WE WOULD RAISE A "POLITICAL ISSUE WHICH COULD HAVE VERY UNFORTUNATE CONSEQUENCES." IN PARTICULAR, HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A RISK THAT SOME EC NINE PARLIAMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE BUNDESTAG, COULD AS A RESULT REACT BADLY TOWARD WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED SO FAR. HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ALREADY A PERCEPTION IN EUROPE THAT THE EURATOM-IAEA AGREEMENT HAS BEEN "STRETCHED" BY THE PRESENT COMPROMISE ON IMPLEMENTATION, AND SUGGESTED THAT NEGATIVE SOVIET STATEMENTS AT RECENT IAEA GOVERNING BOARD MEETING, PLUS US "QUESTIONS" AT SAME SESSION, COULD BE MISREAD IN EUROPE IN AN ADVERSE WAY. LOOSCH SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION NEITHER THE US, NOR THE FRG, NOR ANY OTHER NATION, CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR THE IAEA SECRETARIAT AND THE EC COMMISSION, WHO ARE THE TWO PARTIES ENTRUSTED WITH REACHING AGREEMENT. OF COURSE, COUNTRIES COULD MAKE SUGGESTIONS TO THE PARTIES, BUT SHOULD NOT SEEK A MORE DECISIVE ROLE.

4. LOOSCH SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ORIGINALLY THE EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW, WAS THAT THE RATIO OF IAEA TO EURATOM VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE SUCH THAT WITHIN

THE COMMUNITY THE SUM OF IAEA AND EURATOM ACTIVITIES WAS TO EQUAL THE LEVEL OF IAEA ACTIVITIES ALONE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND THAT THE EURATOM POSITION HAD MOVED CONSIDERABLY FROM THIS. HE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE UNIQUENESS OF EURATOM. THE US (BORIGHT AND ACDA/HOUCK) POINTED OUT THAT THE US WAS NOT QUESTIONING THE MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER OF EURATOM BUT THAT THERE IS A RECORD IN THE IAEA WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE CAN BE REVERSED. THIS RECORD IS THAT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS HAS ALREADY APPROVED A SIMILAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN AND THAT THE PRECEDENT FOR OTHER NNWS FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD COULD BE ALARMING, SINCE THERE IS A HISTORY OF INDICATIONS BY THE IAEA THAT OTHER STATES COULD HAVE A SIMILAR AGREEMENT IF THEY IMPLEMENTED AN APPROPRIATE NATIONAL SYSTEM. LOOSCH
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AGREED THAT THIS WAS A "DILEMMA." BUT HE STRESSED THAT SUCH POSSIBLE PRECEDENTIAL RESULTS SHOULD NOT OPERATE TO

"CUT EURATOM DOWN TO THE SIZE" OF STATES WHICH MAY CLAIM EQUAL SAFEGUARDS LEVELS IN THE FUTURE FOR THEIR NATIONAL SYSTEMS: IF THIS IS THE US DIRECTION, HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT EXPECT HIM TO REPORT THE PRESENT CONVERSATION BACK TO BONN, SINCE THE REACON WOULD BE VERY NEGATIVE. US EXPLAINED THAT THE US HAS AT NO TIME IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EC OR ITS MEMBERS SUGGESTED ANY REDUCTION IN THE ROLE OF EURATOM. OUR CONCERN HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO AVOID UNDESIRABLE RESTRICTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE IAEA. LOOSCH SAID THAT ONE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE FORCE OF A HISTORY OF IAEA STATEMENTS TO JAPAN WHILE REJECTING THE HISTORY OF THE EURATOM-IAEA NEGOTIATIONS. THE US POINTED OUT THAT AS WE PERCEIVED MATTERS THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EURATOM AND IAEA SEEM TO US TO HAVE BEEN COMPLICATED BY WHAT WE PERCEIVED TO BE THE EURATOM POSITION THAT THE EURATOM SAFEGUARDS ROLE WAS IDENTICAL TO THE IAEA SAFEGUARDS ROLE. SUCH A SITUATION MAKES AVOIDANCE OF DUPLICATION VERY DIFFICULT. SINCE EURATOM'S SAFEGUARDS CHARTER IS EXTREMELY BROAD, WE WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS NOT IMPORTANT SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES TO BE DONE BY EURATOM THAT WERE NOT LIKELY TO BE DONE DURING IAEA INSPECTIONS IN ANY COUNTRIES. LOOSCH RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT SUCH ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE.

5. LOOSCH SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO GET THE EURATOM-IAEA AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT ENCOURAGING RAPID IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT COMPROMISE WHILE WORKING LATER TO STRENGTHEN IT WAS MUCH PREFERABLE TO INSISTING ON THE RENEGOTIATION IN SUBSIDIARY FACILITY ATTACHMENTS NOW OF FAR HIGHER STANDARDS
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WHICH CANNOT BE ACCEPTED.

6. OCTOBER 20 CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH ACDA (HOUCK) OUTLINE OF TOPICS US GROUP PLANS TO EXPLORE NEXT WEEK IN LUXEMBOURG AND BRUSSELS: (A) TIMELINESS OF DETECTION BY IAEA OF MISSING MATERIAL; (B) SENSITIVITY OF IAEA SYSTEM IN TERMS OF THE AMOUNTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE DETECTED IF MISSING; AND (C) USE BY IAEA OF CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE MEASURES TO COMPLEMENT MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY. LOOSCH HAD LITTLE COMMENT, BUT QUESTIONED WHETHER IAEA WOULD HAVE THE RESOURCES TO CARRY OUT HIGHER-LEVEL ACTIVITIES, EVEN IF THEY WERE OTHERWISE ACCEPTABLE.

7. IN OCTOBER 21 CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR SMITH, DITTMANN UNDERScoreD MANY OF LOOSCH'S POINTS AND SAID FRG IS "WORRIED AND CONCERNED" THAT EURATOM-IAEA COMPROMISE WOULD UNRAVEL IF ASPECTS OF IT ARE CALLED INTO QUESTION BY THE US. HE SAID THAT THE COMMUNITY "LEANED OVER BACKWARDS" TO BE FORTHCOMING ON THE "MOST SENSITIVE PART"

OF IMPLEMENTATION, AND HE SUGGESTED THAT THE US WAS NOW IN EFFECT TAKING THAT PART OF THE PACKAGE FOR GRANTED AND ASKING FOR YET FURTHER EURATOM CONCESSIONS ON THE REMAINDER. HE SAID THAT FRG WOULD BE "DISAPPOINTED" IF US ATTITUDE CREATED DIFFICULTIES IN THE BUNDESTAG "WHICH CANNOT BE CONTROLLED." HE CONCLUDED THAT AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION WAS A MATTER FOR THE IAEA AND EURATOM, AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE MATTER TO BECOME A "BILATERAL PROBLEM" FOR THE US AND THE FRG.

8. AMBASSADOR SMITH RESPONDED BY NOTING OUR CONCERN REGARDING PRECEDENTIAL ASPECT OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN EURATOM NNWS FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN OTHER NNWS. WE ALSO NOTED THAT RECENT INFORMATION SUGGESTED THAT US AND EURATOM VIEWS ON SAFEGUARDS FOR LWR MIGHT NOT BE AS FAR APART AS EARLIER PERCEIVED. AMBASSADOR SMITH CONCLUDED BY EXPRESSING HOPE

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THAT IF THIS WERE THE CASE THE WAY HAS BEEN OPENED FOR A SOLUTION. VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 22-Oct-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE254512
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: W R SALISBURY: FF
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770389-1095
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771029/aaaaayga.tel
Line Count: 219
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: aa85db28-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 BRUSSELS 14323
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 23-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 813527
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US-EURATOM DISCUSSION OF SAFEGUARDS -- INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH FRG REPS CONFIDENTIAL
TAGS: TECH, MNUC, BE, EEC, IAEA, EURATOM
To: BRUSSELS LONDON MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/aa85db28-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009